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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
negligence, as well as for homicide resulting from wanton, wilful or
criminal negligence.27
IRviN E. ERB.
Public Utilities--When a Utility May Withhold or Withdraw
Service For Reasons of Credit.
Where, upon the payment of the usual fee, a telephone company
refused to furnish its service without an additional deposit, on the
ground that plaintiff was admittedly a bad credit risk, held, the com-
pany must serve the plaintiff without the additional security on the
same terms as it serves other subscribers.'
It is almost universally conceded that a public utility may with-
draw and withhold its service for nonpayment of a recent and just
bill, since collection by legal process is practically prohibitive. And
this is so even though the consumer has some counterclaim against
the company.2 But although the bill be legitimate, where the sum is
owed by a public agency, the corporation may not use the summary
method employed in collecting its debts from delinquent individuals,
since here mandamus will lie to compel the proper official to pay the
bill.$ Another instance where. the courts will enjoin a public utility
from withholding service for nonpayment of a recent bill is where the
refusal to pay is on the ground that its service has been inadequate.4
And where the bill is bona fide in dispute, the company may not re-
fuse to serve the consumer until such bill is paid.3 The courts are
very reluctant to permit the corporation to be its own judge and jury
' Micba~l v. Western & Atlantic R. Co., 165 S. E. 37, 43 (Ga. 1932).
'Horton v. Interstate Tel. & Tel. Co., 202 N. C. 610, 163 S. E. 694 (1932).
The court explains its decision on the ground that the rule requiring an addi-
tional deposit by bad. risks had never been approved by the Corporation Com-
mission. It takes no definite stand, but intimates in a nebulous manner, that
in the absence of such fact, it might have reached a contrary result.
'Barrett v. Broad River Power Co., 146 S. C. 85, 143 S. E. 650 (1928);
Central La. Power Co. v. Thomas, 145 Miss. 352, 110 So. 673 (1927) ; Buffalo
County Tel. Co. v. Turner, 82 Neb. 841, 118 N. W. 1064 (1908); Irvin v.
Rushville Co-operative Tel. Co., 161 Ind. 524, 69 N. E. 258 (1903).
' Board of Education v. Richmond, 137 N. Y. Supp. 62 (1912) (water supply
in a school) ; People ex rel. Johnson v. Barrows, 124 N. Y. Supp. 270 (1910)
(water supply of public park).
'Mays v. Hutchinson, P. U. R. 1931B 104 (Pa. 1930); Case v. Meadow
Lawn Tel. Co., P. U. R. 1929A 421 (Minn. 1928); State ex rel. Payne v.
Kuloch Tel. Co., 93 Mo. App. 349, 67 S. W. 684 (1902) ; McEntee v. Kingston
Water Co., 165 N. Y. 27, 58 N. E. 785 (1900).
'O'Neal v. Citizen's Pub. Service Co., 157 S. C. 320, 154 S. E. 217 (1930);
Ala. Water Service Co. v. Harris, 221 Ala. 516, 129 So. 5 (1930); Dodd v.
City of Atlanta, 154 Ga. 33, 113 S. E. 166 (1922) ; Poole v. Paris Mt. Water
Co., 81 S. C. 438, 62 S. E. 874 (1908).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
and coerce the recalcitrant one into submission by denying him serv-
ice. But if the consumer, refusing to pay the bill because of his
bona fide belief that it is unjust, has his service discontinued, he is
not entitled to damages merely because of his belief, if it is proved
that the bill is in fact correct. 6 Nor may a utility withdraw its serv-
ice for nonpayment of an unreasonable, 7 discriminatory, s or obviously
excessive charge.9
Some courts hold that the payment of arrearages for service at
the same place is not required and the only condition precedent to a
right to have the service is a tender for it.1O Others say that the
payment of arrearages may be demanded before service is ex-
tended.1 But where an old bill has been passed over and later ones
accepted, the company is said to have waived its right to discontinue
service for nonpayment.12
It is generally held that service cannot be refused at one place
because the consumer is in arrears at another place at the same
time1 3 or because he was in arrears at a different place.14 'Nor can
the company urge another's default as an excuse for withholding
'Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Warren Ellison Cafe, 231 Ky. 538, 21 S. W. (2d)
976 (1929).
Barrell v. Lake Forest Water Co., 191 Ill. App. 269 (1915); Ball v. Tex-
arkana Water Corp., 127 S. W. 1068 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910); Borough of
Washington v. Washington Water Co., 70 N. J. Eq. 254, 62 Atl. 390 (1905).
SGordon & Ferguson v. Doran, 100 Minn. 343, 111 N. W. 272 (1907).
' Pond v. New Rochelle Water Co., 183 N. Y. 330, 76 N. E. 211 (1906);
Horsky v. Helena Consolidated Water Co., 13 Mont. 229, 33 Pac. 689 (1893).
'
0 Johnson v. Carolina Gas & Electric Co., 106 .S. C. 447, 91 S. E. 734
(1917); Taylor v. N. Y. Tel. Co., 160 N. Y. Supp. 865 (1916); Danaher v.
S. W. Tel. & Tel. Co., 94 Ark. 533, 127 S. W. 963 (1910); S. W. Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Luckett, 127 S. W. 856 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910); Crumley v. Watauga
Water Co., 99 Tenn. 420, 41 S. W. 1058 (1897).
"Bailey v. Interstate Power Co., 209 Iowa 631, 228 N. W. 644 (1930).
State ex rel. Latshaw v. Board of Water & Light Commissioners, 105 Minn.
472, 117 N. W. 827 (1908).
" Crumley v. Watauga Water Co., supra note 10; Wood v. City of Auburn,
87 Me. 287, 32 AtI. 906 (1895). Contra: Mackin v. Portland Gas Co., 38
Ore. 120, 61 Pac. 134 (1900) ; People ex rel. Kennedy v. Manhattan Gaslight
Co., 45 Barb. 136 (N. Y. 1865).
23Texas Central Power Co. v. Perez, 291 S. W. 622 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927)
(a store owner in debt for outside lights); Merill v. Liverm6re Falls Light
& Power Co., 117 Me. 523, 105 Atl. 120 (1918) (a business man in default
at his residence) ; Gaslight Co. of Baltimore v. Colliday, 25 Md. 1 (1866)
(owner of several pieces of property in default on one).
"Miller v. Roswell Gas & Elect. Co., 22 N. M. 594, 166 Pac. 1177 (1917);
Benson v. Paris Mt. Water Co., 88 S. C. 351, 70 S. E. 897 (1911); Hatch v.
Consumers' Co., 17 Idaho 204, 104 Pac. 670 (1909) ; Mackin v. Portland Gas
Co., supra note 12; Lloyd v. Washington Gaslight Co., 1 Mackey 331 (D. C.
1881). Contra: Clark v. Utica Gas & Electric Co., 231 N. Y. Supp. 308 (1928);
Jones v. Mayor of Nashville, 109 Tenn. 550, 72 S. W. 985 (1903).
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service even though such other person is the consumer's husband'5
or wife.' 0 And in the absence of express statutory provision mak-
ing a service charge a lien on the premises, a new customer cannot
be denied service because of the default of the landlord' 7 or previous
tenant.18
Where it is impossible to serve a prospective customer without at
the same time supplying one not entitled to service because of non-
payment, the utility is released from its duty.19 The opposite view,
however, has been recognized; and one court has held that the lessee
of part of a room, where he applies for it in good faith, is entitled
to service, although the lessor, occupying the remainder of the room,
is in default.20
When the question of the general credit of the person is involved
and payment in advance is not required by the company, some courts
have said that a bad financial risk would justify the company in ask-
ing for security before extending service.21 And demanding pay-
ment in advance from one financially irresponsible is permissible
even when such payment is not demanded of others.22 But it has
been held, in accord with the principal case, that where a person
offered to pay in advance, a company could not withhold service be-
cause of that person's credit rating.23
" Vanderburg v. Kansas City Gas Co., 126 Mo. App. 600, 105 S. W. 17(1907).
" Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hobart, 89 Miss. 252, 42 So. 349 (1906).
"TAla. Water Co. v. Knowles, 220 Ala. 61, 124 So. 96 (1929).
"Carnaggio Bros. v. City of Greenwood, 142 Miss. 885, 108 So. 141 (1926);
Farmer v. Nashville, 127 Tenn. 509, 156 S. W. 189 (1912) ; City of Houston
v. Lockwood Inv. Co., 144 S. W. 685 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912); Nourse v. City
of Los Angeles, 25 Cal. App. 384, 143 Pac. 801 (1914) ; Covington v. Ratter-
man, 128 Ky. 336, 108 S. W. 297 (1908) (vendor's debt). Where, however,
there is a statutory provision, it does create a lien on the land. Howe v.
Orange, 70 N. J. Eq. 648, 62 Atl. 777 (1906) (grantor's default); Gerard L.
Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia, 88 Pa. 393 (1879) (purchaser of land at sheriff's sale).
11Birmingham Waterworks Co. v. Brooks, 16 Ala. App. 209, 76 So. 515
(1917); Frothingham v. Benson, 44 N. Y. Supp. 879 (1897). The company
must serve a person so situated, upon the installation of a separate connection.
I Gaines v. Charleston Light & Water Co., 104 S. C. 136, 88 S. E. 378
(1916); Ginnings v. Meridian Waterworks Co., 100 Miss. 507, 56 So. 450
(1911).
'Phelan v. Boone Gas Co., 147 Iowa 626, 125 N. W. 208 (1910). Requir-
ing a deposit or guarantee of a bad financial risk is a reasonable regulation.
Contra: Barriger v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 196 Ky. 268, 244 S. W.
690 (1922).
' Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U. S. 482, 35 Sup. Ct.
886, 59 L. ed. 1419 (1915) ; Allen v. Cape Fear & Yadkin Valley Ry. Co., 100
N. C. 397, 6 S. E. 105 (1887). Although it implies a charge of impaired
credit, a common carrier has the right to demand the prepayment of charges
from one, even where it extends credit to others.
I O'Neal v. Citizen's Pub. Service Co., supra note 5.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
In North Carolina, while previously no situation has arisen com-
parable to the principal case, the court has strongly inclined towards
upholding and enforcing the public duty of the utility to serve all
similarly situated on equal terms 24  Was the plaintiff in the prin-
cipal case "similarly situated ?" It has further been held that the com-
pany may refuse to serve those who will not comply with its reason-
able rules and regulations. 25  Was not the requirement for an addi-
tional deposit "reasonable" under the circumstances?
It would seem that the court has displayed extraordinary solic-
itude for the subscriber. The decision is partly justified by the re-
quirement of payment in advance, but how is the company to protect
itself against nonpayment of additional charges, such as long dis-
tance calls?
CECILE L. PIrTZ.
Real Property-Adverse Possession of Separate
Interests in Land.
The plaintiff occupied land by adverse possession under color of
title for the statutory period. The defendant claimed the timber
growing on the land, basing his claim on a recorded timber deed
givdn prior to the time the plaintiff took possession of the land.
Held: The adverse possession of the land did not conclude the prior
lessee of the timber upon the land.'
Under both the common law and the Georgia Code "the right of
the owner of lands extends downward and upward indefinitely."2
Yet, there may be ownership in fee of several distinct interests in
connection with a single tract of land. One person may own the
surface of the land, another the buildings, another the timber grow-
ing on the land, and still another the minerals beneath the surface.8
Therefore, one having title to the surface may have valid claims as-
"Griffin v. Goldsboro Water Co., 122 N. C. 206, 30 S. E. 319 (1898);
Clinton-Dunn Telephone Co. v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 159 N. C. 8, 74
S. E. 636 (1912); S. & S. Ry. Co. & N. C. Pub. Service Co. v. So. Pr. Co.,
180 N. C. 422, 105 S. E. 28 (1920).
' Woodley v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 163 N. C. 284, 79 S. E. 598(1913).
McNeill v. Daniel, 164 S. E. 187 (Ga. 1932).
12 BL. CoMM. 18; GA. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1926) §3617.
'Fox v. Pearl River Lumber Co., 80 Miss. 1, 31 So. 583 (1902); Walters
v. Sheffield, 78 Fla. 505, 78 So. 539 (1918).
